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Upon Information
and Belief
My, my, such a business. Here we have always thought that one
should not put off until tomorrow what can be done today-especially
when the greens and fairways might be covered with snow tomorrow.
And what with the deer season just closing and the ditck season just
opening and us trying to get in one more fishing trip before the season
ends. And not only that, but here comes our client-the client, if you
please-and wants us to try his case. Well, you can readily appreciate
how difficult it has been to get out DICTA for this month. But here
we are.
Health and accident insurance under a group plan is now available
to members of the Denver Bar Association. At the last meeting of the
association the legislative committee reported that both the plan and the
company proposing the plan had been investigated and the committee
recommended that the plan be adopted. The report of the committee
was approved by the association. Full particulars will be mailed to each
member of the association within the next few days.

1941 Amendments to Statutes Relating
to Sale of Real Estate in
Probate Proceedings
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT °
The old procedure to sell real estate was contained in the 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated, Chapter 176, Sections 160 to 193. Many
of these sections were amended by the 1941 Session Laws, Chapter 235.
Of course, these sections present a very detailed method of procedure and
should be carefully examined.
It is possible to say, in a general way, that the amendments liberalize and simplify the procedure. For "cample, the personal representative
*Of the Denver bar.
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may sell only a portion of the real estate in the estate and in his petition
for sale he need only describe such portions as he wishes to mortgage or
sell.
Another major change is that the Notice of Hearing of Sale fixes the
time not less than ten days, nor more than ninety days after the filing
of the petition. A streamlined provision is contained by which all persons in interest may waive service of notice and petition and the sale may
be held forthwith, that is, in less than ten days and no publication need
be had. The statute now specifically permits a guardian ad litem to waive
notice of hearing on the petition to sell real estate. The amendment now
permits the personal representative to exchange property in the estate for
other property, which he was formerly unable to do. If sale is made
upon credit, the requirements are liberalized so that credit may be given
for three-fourths of the purchase price instead of one-half as formerly.
The procedure by which a non-resident guardian or conservator sells
property in Colorado is somewhat changed by the amended statute.
Most of the difficulties arise in the following manner: The old
statute required that the administrator's deed should, "recite in substance
the order of the court." Under this statute it was the common practice to
copy in full the order for sale in the administrator's deed. This deed
was usually supported by a certified copy of the order for sale, the order
confirming sale and the letters of administration or letters testamentary.
All of these were recorded. The new statute provides that the conveyance "shall recite the order of court confirming the sale." It will be seen
that the requirement is mandatory and the only order which should
appear in the administrator's deed is the order confirming the sale. The
printing companies have recognized this situation and they have printed
new forms which contain a space for the order confirming sale and have
omitted from such forms any space for the order for sale. It is the judgment of many attorneys that the use of the old form is no longer sufficient
to comply with the statute. It is, therefore, important that the new form
of administrator's or executor's deed be used in any conveyance in real
estate under the statutory sale proceedings, since the effective date of the
new law, which is April 17, 1941.
It might be pertinent to point out that the new statute makes such a
deed, containing the order of court confirming the sale, prima facie evidence that such sale is made and the proceedings were had in conformity
with the statute. Many attorneys are of the opinion that this language
dispenses with the necessity of recording certified copies as was formerly
the practice. It would seem that tnder the amended statute, the administrator's or executor's deed containing the proper order, together with
the certified copy of letters of administration or letters testamentary, are
all that need be recorded to show a proper conveyance of real estate out
of an estate.

Situs of Vendor's Interest in

Contract of Sale of Real
Estate Under Colorado
Inheritance Tax Law
By W. CLAYTON CARPENTER*
In a recent decision the Attorney General of Colorado has ruled that
the interest of a deceased vendor in a contract for the sale of real estate is
subject to Colorado inheritance tax, provided the vendor was a resident
of Colorado, even though the real estate is located outside of Colorado,
and, conversely, that where the deceased vendor was a non-resident and
the real estate located in Colorado, the interest of the deceased vendor in
such contract is not taxable under Colorado law.
The opinion of the Attorney General states in part:
"In view of the position that the Colorado courts have taken
with reference to such contracts, I am of the opinion that, as regards
the doctrine of equitable conversion, our courts would follow the
majority rule rather than the minority rule and would hold that
there is an equitable conversion of real estate into personalty at the
date of the execution of the contract.
"I am of the opinion that in the case of a non-resident decedent who, during his lifetime, enters into an executory contract for
the sale of his real estate situate in Colorado, an equitable conversion
occurs at the date of execution of the contract and that for inheritance taxation purposes the interest of such vendor should be considered intangible personal property and not real estate; and that
the interest of the vendee in such a contract should be considered
real estate. In the case of a resident decedent who, during his lifetime, enters into an executory contract for the sale of his land situate outside the State of Colorado, I am of the opinion that the interest of the vendor should be considered intangible personal property
and taxed as such."'
Irrespective of inheritance tax laws, it is well established as a fundamental principle of the laws of descent and distribution that the interest
of a deceased vendor under a contract of sale of real estate constitutes personal property and passes to his executor or administrator, and that the
*Of the Denver bar.
'Letter dated July 26, 1941, from Attorney General Gail L. Ireland to Inheritance
Tax Commissioner Berton T. Gobble.
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interest of a deceased vendee under such a contract is real estate and descends to his heirs at law.
Storey states the rule as follows:
"Thus if a man has entered into a valid contract for the purchase of land, he is treated in equity as the equitable owner of the
land, and the vendor is treated as the owner of the money. The
purchaser may devise it as land, even before the conveyance is made,
and it passes by descent to his heir as land. * * *
"Under such circumstances the vendee is treated as the owner
of the land, and it is devisable and descendible as his real estate.
On the other hand the money is treated as the personal estate of the
vendor, and is subject to the like modes of disposition by him as
other personalty,
and is distributable in the same manner on his
2
death."
This rule is based upon the theory of equitable conversion.
In determining the taxability of a decedent vendor's interest under
the inheritance tax laws, it would seem that the same rule should apply,
and most of the courts have so held. Their decisions are based upon
three legal theories.
The state of Washington follows the theory of equitable conversion:
"We have consistently held that the situs of intangible property is at all times at the domicile of the owner. We have also
repeatedly held that a vendor's interest under an executory contract
for the sale of land should be treated as personalty for the purpose
of administration. We cannot see any good reason for holding
that, for the purpose of administration of an estate, a vendor's interest in such a contract should be treated as personalty but not so
treated when the question of inheritance taxation is involved. The
two situations are not distinguishable on principle." '
Some courts have takeii the position that the effect of a contract of
sale is practitally the same as a mortgage. The vendor is said to hold the
bare legal title to the land in trust for the vendee and as security for the
payment of the debt. This view is touched upon by the Colorado Supreme Court, in Marvin v. Stimpson.4 In that case the court quoted with
approval the following statement from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:
" 'By the terms of the contract the land ought to be conveyed
2

STOREY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) 486, §1092.
'Inre Eilermann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P. (2d) 763 (1934).
KIDDER, STATE INHERITANCE TAX AND TAXABILITY OF TRUSTS (1934)

'23 Colo. 174, 46 Pac. 673 (1996).

See also
250.
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to the vendee, and the purchase price ought to be transferred to the
vendor; equity, therefore, regards these as done: the vendee as having acquired the property in the land, and the vendor as having
acquired the property in the price. The vendee is looked upon and
treated as the owner of the land; an equitable estate has vested in
him commensurate with that provided for by the contract, whether
in fee, for life, or for years; although the vendor remains owner
of the legal estate, he holds it as a trustee for the vendee to whom all
the beneficial interests has passed, having a lien on the land, even
if in possession of the vendee, as security for any unpaid portion of
the purchase money.' "
Under inheritance tax laws, the general rule has been that mortgage
notes, like stocks and bonds, are considered intangible personal property
subject to tax by the state of decedent's domicile.
Other courts have not attempted to apply any particular theory to
support the taxability, but have taken the broader ground that intangible
personal property is taxable at the domicile of the decedent, that any
contract right, whether with relation to property or not, is an intangible
property right which can be appraised and taxed by the state'of the
domicile of the decedent.
This holding is adhered to in In Re Russell's Estate, the court
saying:
"*
*
*
the amount due upon the contract of sale must
be regarded as intangible, and not tangible, property, and, as the
decedent was a nonresident, the transfer thereof is not subject to
a tax. '""

In State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, the Minnesota Supreme
Court said:
"The decedent sold his Montana land under an executory contract which obligated the vendee to pay the purchase price and gave
him the right to the possession of the land. If the decedent's interest under this contract is to be deemed personal property, it is
subject to a succession tax in Minnesota, the state of his domicile;
if it is to be deemed real estate, it is not subject to such tax in
Minnesota, but only in Montana, where the land is located. We
are of opinion that State t. Rand, 39 Minn. 502, 40 N. W. 835,
is decisive of the question under consideration. In that case the
defendants, residents of the city of Minneapolis, sold a tract of
land in that city under an executory contract which obligated the
'Supra, note 4, at 182-183. 46 Pac. at 676.
"ll9Misc. 12, 194N. Y. Supp. 837 (1922),
'145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493 (1920).
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vendee, a corporation, to pay the purchase price and entitled it to
the possession of the land. It was held in an exhaustive opinion
that the interest of the vendors under this executory contract was
taxable as a credit under the general tax laws."

In Dodge County v.Burns,8 the Nebraska court held that the interest of a deceased New York vendor could not be reached for inheritance
tax purposes in Nebraska.
While the Attorney General seems to have based his opinion upon
the theory of equitable conversion, which is of course sufficient to sustain it where that theory is accepted in applying both the laws of descent
and distribution and inheritance tax laws, the third or broader ground
just referred to may ultimately prove to be the soundest basis in view
of the recent trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.'
The mortgage theory, if solely relied upon in Colorado, might lead
to distinctions based upon the different forms of contracts, because of the
decisions of our Supreme Court holding some forms of contracts of sale
to be like mortgages and others not to be. 10 It is doubtful whether any
distinction on such a basis for tax purposes would b'e sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States, which has recently declined to base
taxable status upon "niceties of the art of conveyancing."'"
Too close an adherence to the doctrine of equitable conversion may
also lead the courts into difficulties. This seems to have been the case
in a recent Pennsylvania decision, In re Estate of Henry S. Paul,'2 which
holds that the decedent vendor's interest cannot be taxed by the state of
his domicile. That case involved a resident of Pennsylvania, who died
seized of real estate in New Jersey and Massachusetts concerning which he
had entered into contracts of sale prior to his death. The Pennsylvania
taxing officers appraised the contracts at less than their unpaid balances,
and assessed an inheritance tax thereon. During the administration of
the estate, these balances were paid and deeds issued to the purchasers
by the executor of the estate. In reversing the action of the taxing
officers and holding the decedent's interests in the contracts nontaxable
inPennsylvania, the court seemed to be influenced by six cases: Frick u.
'89 Neb. 534, 131 N. W. 922 (1911).
'See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. ed. 1339 (1939).
and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913, 83 L. ed. 1356 (1939), although our subject does not include any consideration of the power of two states to
tax the vendor's interest.
"°See Morris, Must Colorado Real Property Installment Sales Be Foreclosed as
Mortgages? (1932) 9 DiCTA 320.
1
"Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60S. Ct. 444, 84 L. ed. 604 (1940).
1303 Pa. 330, 154 Ard. 503, 78 A. L. R. 779 (1931).
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Pennsylvania,1 3 In re Robinson's Estate,i4 In re Croxton's Estate,1 5 Mc-

Curdy u. McCurdy,' Heymann v. Viane,1 7 and Safe Deposit & Trust
Company v. Virginia.'s
The Frick case is well known. It holds that the situs of tangible
personal property for inheritance tax purposes is the state in which the
property is located, not the state of domicile of the owner.
The facts in the Robinson and Croxton cases are very meagerly
stated in the reports, but they both apparently involve.the question as to
whether the provisions of the wills under consideration in those cases
worked an equitable ccnversion of the real estate for inheritance tax purposes, and it was held that they did not.
In the McCurdy case, an ancillary administrator tried to compel
the domiciliary administrator to pay a mortgage owed by the decedent
on land in the state of the ancillary administration so as to leave the full
value of the real estate in the latter state for taxation. The contention
was made that the doctrine of equitable conversion required the court
to consider that the debt would be paid by the state of domiciliary administration. The court refused to so hold, saying that the ancillary
administration had to be carried on independently of the domiciliary
administration, and consequently the only taxable value of the real
estate would be the equity of redemption. The court did remark in
the course of its opinion:
"The law of equitable conversion ought not to be invoked
merely to subject property to taxation, especially when the question
is one of jurisdiction between different states.""'
In the Heymann case the will provided that the executor should
sell the real estate, and this was done. Thereupon, the executor contended that the inheritance tax lien had shifted from the real estate to the
proceeds, but the court held to the contrary, saying:
"The doctrine of equitable conversion may not be relied on to
subject property to taxation or to shift the lien of the tax from the
2
real property to the fund."- 0

With these cases in mind, the Pennsylvania court argued that the
vendor's interest in contracts of sales could not be considered intangible
1268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058 (1925).
"285 Pa. 308, 132 Atd. 127 (1926).

"288 Pa. 184, 135 At. 626 (1927).
"197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 329, 14 Ann. Cas. 859
(1908).
11252 N. Y. 159, 169 N. E. 124 (1929).
s280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929).
"Supra note 16, at 250, 83 N. E. at 882.
"Supra note 17, at 166, 169 N. E. at 126.
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personal property, subject to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, because
(1) the doctrine of equitable conversion could not be availed of to subject the property to taxation; (2) the existence of the contract of sale
was therefore of no effect; (3) the "reality" was the real estate in the
contract; (4) under the Frick case the "reality" was physically present
in the foreign state and therefore outside the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania;
and (5) the trend of current decisions was in favor of limiting the power
of taxation to the state in which the property was actually located.
The court said, in part:
"There can be no question but that no tax could be collected
on the lands as lands. * * * Is this situation altered because
of the existence of the writings under which the decedent had
agreed to convey the lands when the consideration therefor was
paid? Is the thing sought to be taxed any the less the land because of the writing, the vendor being still possessed of the real
estate when he died?
"We are asked to disregard the fact of the testator still holding
title to and possession of the lands, and to indulge in the makebelieve that the land had been transmuted into something else.
We are not prepared to do so. The agreements of sale are not the
vital factor. * * *
"While an agreement for sale of land, which contains a promise to pay the purchase price agreed upon, is in one sense a chose
in action, it differs in essential respects from the ordinary chose.
Aside from the agreement to sell, no such liability ever did exist.
Its basic purpose, as a writing, is to fix the rights of the vendor and
the vendee in the land; liability for the purchase price is but secondary and contingent. The fee in the land is still in the vendor, and
it is the fee which is to be transferred upon payment of the balance
of the purchase price. In case of default, neither the vendor nor
those standing in his shoes are compelled to sue for that balance in
order to be recompensed; they may elect to retain the land. * * *
"If the conversion had been worked by will, no tax could be
levied. * * * It is difficult to see wherein the difference lies
between conversion by will and conversion by agreement of sale.
In each instance the decedent would die seised of the land, which
is the reality. Taxes should be levied upon realities, not upon
fictions. * * *
"The whole modern tendency is to limit the levying of in-
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heritance taxes
to the sovereignty which is the situs of the actual
2
property." 1
22
The decisions of the two earlier Pennsylvania cases relied upon
related solely to the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion in
the interpretation of the provisions of a will. For example, if a will contains a direction to the executor to sell all of his property and distribute
the proceeds among the beneficiaries of the will, it is considered, for the
purposes of distribution, that there has been an equitable conversion of
the real estate into personalty. There may well be a distinction, however,
between such an equitable conversion effected by the death of the owner
of real estate whose death brings into existence the liability for the inheritance tax. In other words, in such a case, the decedent actually owns
complete title to the real estate up to the date of his death, and the tax
attaches to what he owned at the date of his death. But in the case of a
contract of sale, the vendor has consummated the conversion of his interest from the ownership of real estate to the ownership of a contract relating to real estate, and when he dies, he no longer owns the real estate free
and dear, but only subject to the terms of the contract out of which he
derives his sole remaining rights with regard to the real estate. In such
a case, it cannot be said that the rule of equitable conversion is being
applied for the purpose of changing the taxable status of any property;
the status has been created by applying that rule before the incidence of
the inheritance tax.

Hence, it seems that the reliance of the Pennsylvania court upon the
two Pennsylvania cases and the comments in the Massachusetts and New
York cases, has very slim support.
The court likewise seems ta have been unfortunate when in 1931
it ventured a prophecy that the trend of deqisions was to limit the levying
of inheritance taxes to the sovereignty which is the situs of the actual
property, and relied in part upon the case of Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Virginia.23 The doctrine of that case has probably been modified by later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.24
Two judges dissented from the decision in the Paul case, and one of
them, Judge Maxey, wrote an exhaustive and comprehensive opinion in
which the various theories and cases were discussed. Although he pointed
out that even under previous Pennsylvania decisions the decision in the
Paulcase was wrong, he took the broader position that the contract right
'Supra note 12, at 334. 154 AtI. at 504.
'inre Robinson's Estate. supra note 14, and In re Croxton's Estate, supra note 15.
'Supra
note 18.
2
Supra note 9.
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was a matter of property which could be separately valued irrespective of
its relation to any property at all.
He disposed of the theory of equitable conversion with a brief
reference to the Robinson case:
"The distinction between that case and the case before us is
so obvious that it does not require extended discussion. In that
case the property in question was the decedent's real estate at the
time of his death, and it had its situs in another state. It had the
status of real estate at the moment of its owner's death and all inheritance rights are based on facts as they exist at the moment of a
decedent's death. Though the land was directed to be sold, it
might not be sold for years, but, regardless of when it was sold,
the only property right the decedent had in that land or in relation
to that land, at the time of his death, was the land itself. It was
not a subject over which the sovereign power of Pennsylvania
extended, and therefore was not a legitimate object of Pennsylvania
taxation. In the case before us, the vendor's interest in the extraterritorial real estate had in his lifetime been converted into a solvent
credit which attached to him in Pennsylvania. The legal creator of
that personal property was the contract in the vendor's possession,
his interest in which contract Pennsylvania recognized as a property
right. The sovereign force behind this property right was not the
state where the land described in the contract was located, but the
state of the domicile of the man who by that contract was endowed
with certain rights of pecuniary value which his own state would
enforce. This property right was as clearly taxable in Pennsylvania
as it would have been if it had been based on promissory notes given
(Italics the
by the solvent vendee for the purchase of land."
court's.) 25

Then, enlarging upon the true character of a contract of sale, he
said:
"*

*

* it contractually creates and evidences certain rights

of pecuniary value which the law recognizes and will enforce, to
wit, the right of the vendor to demand from the vendee a sum of
money stipulated to be paid. If Paul had agreed to sell to his solvent debtor, and the latter to buy, a tract of land, say, in Florida, in
1925 for $100,000, retaining the naked title as security, and a
year later that land had become worthless, Paul's property in that
contract would still be worth $100,000, and would be listed as
such among his assets, even though the land itself had become
worthless. * * * When a man sells property, real or personal, on a
contract, retaining the title in himself, the retained title is only a
'Supra note 12, at 341, 154 At. at 506.
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pawn. The other's debt to him is his credit, and is correctly listed
among his assets as property, regardless of the pawn. * * *
"[The vendor] acquires from the legally enforceable contract
a right of property distinct from the land to which it relates, this
right of property being intangible personalty (sometimes called 'a
solvent credit,' sometimes called 'a chose in action') whose situs
for taxation and other purposes is its owner's domicile. This property is not any 'make-believe' or legal fiction, but it is an economic
and legal fact. 'Wealth in a commercial age is made up largely of
promises.' Pound's introduction to the Philosophy of Law, p. 236.
Even a government bond or a greenback is only a promise, but it is
clearly taxable as property." 2 ';
In the light of this analysis of the Paul decision, it does not seem
significant that the application for certiorari made to the United States
Supreme Court in that case was denied.

District Attorneys Meet
A meeting of the District Attorneys' Association, a section of the
Colorado Bar Association, was held at the Broadmoor Hotel, September
13, 1941, with James M. Noland of Durango, president of the section,
presiding.
About thirty-five district attorneys, their assistants and deputies,
from virtually every judicial district of the state, were present and participated in the round table discussions which followed remarks of the
speakers. Principal speakers were James Henderson, Assistant Attorney
General, and Harry Bundy, Superintendent of the Colorado Industrial
School, both of whom delivered informative and interesting talks on
Colorado juvenile laws and juvenile institutions.
A. L. Betke, compiler and editor of the new Betke criminal digest
for Colorado, was present, and spoke briefly on his new book. Attorney
General Gail Ireland also attended the meeting and gave a brief address.
This was the first meeting of the section held in conjunction with
the annual meeting of the state association, and it is now planned to make
it an annual event. The regular annual session of the District Attorneys'
Association will be held in Denver next January.
'Supra note 12, at 338, 154 Ad. at 506.

State Bar Receives National Award of Merit
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The colorado Bar Association was awarded the annual Award of
Merit by the American Bar Association at its recent meeting at Indianapolis for the outstanding work done by state bar associations during the
past year. The St. ILouis Bar Association was given a similar award for
the outstanding work done by a local bar association for the same period.
The awards were made by the Committee on Award of Merit of the section of bar organization activities of the American Bar Association, and
was confirmed by the national association at its meeting on October 2,
1941.
The award was based upon a seven-point program of the state association. The program was briefly this:
First: The drafting and securing the adoption of the new rules of
civil procedure. This work was carried on chiefly by the revision committee of the committee on the rules of civil procedure of which Philip ,S.
Van Cise of Denver was chairman. More than seventy-five lawyers
participated in the drafting of the rules, which were finally adopted,
with minor changes, by the Supreme Court on January 6, 1941,-and
became effective on April 6 of this year.
Second: The drafting of a new code of probate procedure. This
work was undertaken as a result of the resolution passed at the annual
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meeting in September, 1940, when a committee, under the chairmanship
of Hubert D. Henry of Denver worked out a rough draft of the new
code of probate procedure. The portion of this new code was passed by
the last legislature and the committee is still working on changes and
additions necessary to give Colorado complete and up-to-date legislation
for the administration of trusts and estates.
Third: The drafting of water rights codes. The section on water
rights, under the chairmanship of Malcolm Lindsey of Denver, during
the past year has prepared a water rights procedure code which has now
been revised and will be submitted to the legislature in 1942. The section has also mapped out a code dealing with the administration of water
rights and the formation of irrigation districts and plans to present these
in the near future to the legislature for adoption.
Fourth: The work done concerning improved methods of judicial
selection. Since the annual meeting in 1939, the association has been
working on a plan to improve methods of judicial selection in this state.
At the last annual meeting, the committee, under the chairmanship of
Charles Baer of Denver, presented the current plan to remove the selection of judges from politics. This committee intends to carry on the
work proposed under the report which was made at the recent annual
convention.
Fifth: The efforts devoted to the national defense program. The
Colorado Bar Association, immediately upon request from the committee
of the American Bar Association dealing with national defense, created a
state-wide committee having representatives in each county and each judicial district in the state, with John L. Zanoni of Denver as chairman.
This committee working in conjunction with Frazer Arnold, district
representative of the national committee, and Robert E. More, chairman
of the Denver Bar Association committee, has done effective work aiding
in the registration of men under the Selective Service Act and in the administration of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. This work
is still being carried on.
Sixth: The organizing of every section of the state into local bar
associations with the recent creation of the Continental Divide Association. Every section within the state now has an active local bar association, all of whose members are members of the state association. As
a result, Colorado has, for the first time, an active and organized bar
which represents the entire legal profession of the state, and which
through its united efforts was able to create a new and widespread interest
in activities of the local state bar associations.
Seventh: The publication of the new loose leaf service. This new
service, which is now permanently established as a bar association activity, has received widespread acclaim among bar executives throughout the
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nation and has attracted considerable comment. Special attention was
given to this service at the meeting of the section on bar organization
activities at the recent Indianapolis convention of the American Bar
Association.
In addition to these numerous activities, which the state association
has undertaken and sponsored, there has been prepared and will soon be
published an economic survey of the legal profession of Colorado. This
survey was made under the supervision of Mark Harrington of Denver
and Harlan Howlett of Boulder. The state association has joined the
Denver Bar Association in the publication of DICTA and has carried on
its annual meetings and the usual functions of state associations. Among
the other activities which deserve particular mention are the activities of
the grievance committee under the chairmanship of George Epperson of
Fort Morgan, the committee on legal publication and law libraries with
Lyman P. Weld of Lcngmont as chairman, and the committee on legal
institutions with Edward L. Wood of Denver as chairman. Much of the
credit for the award goes to Wilbur Denious, former president, for his
able work in reorganizing the state bar association and to the untiring
efforts of G. Dexter Blount, William R. Kelly and William E. Hutton,
who expanded the activities of the association and carried through the
programs inaugurated by them to a successful conclusion, and also to the
untiring efforts of all members of the association who contributed to the
many activities of the association.
The Award of Merit was first made in 1939, when it was awarded
by the American Bar Association to the South Dakota Bar Association
"for its exceptional and outstanding work in securing the adoption of
legislation authorizing a complete revision of the South Dakota code and
thereafter, through its committees, doing much of the work and bearing
a substantial part of the cost of such revision, and for its further outstanding work in securing the preparation of a law conferring rulemaking power on the South Dakota Supreme Court and assisting in the
preparation of such rules."
In 1940 the award was made to the bar association of Texas for
organizing local bar associations in many counties where no such associations formerly existed, for drafting new rules of civil procedure, preparing an excellent manual on unauthorized practice, and for publishing a
monthly magazine. Awards to local associations in the past two years
have been made to the Dallas Bar Association and the Cleveland Bar
Association.
Mr. Charles Corlett of Monte Vista has advised us that he has a
complete set of Corpus Juris Secundum, Volumes 1 to 26 inclusive,
which he would like to sell.

The Law of
the Chase
By CHARLES J.BEISE*
Post smiled to himself, a smile of satisfaction. And why not? It
had been a hard chase, a real run. The kill was but a matter of minutes
away. His hounds had started the fox in the dim grey light of the early
morning and now after three hours of hard pursuit, Post listened to their
cry-a cry of the kill.
"A real pack, even if I trained them myself," he thought.
It was steep climbing and the soft snow didn't help any. Post
walked slowly.
"What's the difference," Post reflected, "twenty more feet and I'm
where I can see over Crane's fields-and that's where the fox is." He
struggled up.
At the summit a shot sounded, a stranger was making away with
the fox!
"Damn the man," Post shouted. He started to run. "If I can only
lay hands on him'---but he couldn't. Exhausted by the chase, Post sat
down and watched the stranger make away with a fox. A fox? His
fox! He'd show him, he knew who that was, he'd take it to court!
No man could shoot his fox just as the hounds were ready for the kill!
And that's just what he did. It all happened in 1805 and musty
law books report the case of Pierson vs. Post.' Post won the cause in
the lower court but Pierson appealed. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the lower court, gave judgment for the defendant and denied
Post any damages. The court in overruling the lower court said:
"If we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general principles of law the judgment below is obviously erroneous: Justinian's Institutes adopt the principle that pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman; and even pursuit accompanied with
wounding is equally ineffectual for that purpose unless the animal
be actually taken."
Pierson was not exactly popular with the court, however. The
judge remarked of him:
"However uncourteous or unkind the conduct of Pierson toward Post in this instance may have been, yet his act was productive
*Recently of the Durango bar: now with the United States Bureau of Reclamation,
Salt Lake City.
13 Caines 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805).
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of no injury or damage for which a legal remedy can be applied."
And so Post discovered, as have many others to their sorrow, that
where wild animals are concerned, "possession is nine-points of the law."
Possession as defined by most of the decisions means actual, physical,
bodily seizure of the animal. The huntsman must have the game completely under his control before he has initiated a property right the
courts can protect.
The Post case was far reaching. It heralded another legal theory
which was to take over a century to develop in our courts. Dictum was
annoui ced by the court in that case and governed future lawsuits as we
shall see. In discussing the case the court indicated that the mortal
wounding of a beast by a huntsman who does not abandon his pursuit
may be deemed sufficient possession of the animal to sustain title to the
animal and entitle a hunter to invoke the protection of the courts.
Fifteen years later in the same state the court had occasion to more
2
carefully consider its former dictum. In 1822, Newkirk sued Buster.
This time it was over a deer hide and the facts can be summarized as
follows: On the afternoon of December 3 1, 1819, the plaintiff wounded
a deer about six miles from Newkirk's house and continued the chase,
occasionally discovering blood, when he returned to his home for a
night's rest and, arising early, resumed the chase the next morning. In
a short time he found where the defendant had killed the deer late in the
afternoon of the previous day some six miles from the place he, the plaintiff, had wounded it. Plaintiff was hunting with dogs which, after
plaintiff shot, took up the chase and had laid hold of the deer when the
defendant, hearing the commotion, approached and killed the deer, removing the carcass to his home. Newkirk demanded the venison and
skin and Buster gave him the venison but refused to deliver the hide to
Newkirk. A lawsuit to recover damages for the hide resulted. This
time the court had a case nearly in point with the hypothetical question
it had discussed in the Post case. There was, however, this one distinguishing feature-plaintiff had returned home at night for his sleepand thereby lost his buck. The court held that such action amounted to
a temporary abandonment of the hunt, and one more defendant was
allowed to keep the prize. Again the New York court sustained the
principle that it could not aid the hunter unless he had actual physical
possession of the animal before the defendant took it from him.
Gradually but surely, precedent gives way to changing conditions.
Years pass and then some other person decides to vindicate himself.
In Wisconsin, nearly a hundred years later, a case of importance
occurred which finally developed the "dictum" of the New York court
'Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johns. 75 (N. Y. 1822).
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in the Post case and established a precedent of importance, a rule which
shook from the courts the precedents of centuries.
The evidence submitted to the court established these facts: Plaintiffs mortally wounded the wolf and had so followed up their attack
on the animal as to substantially have it in their possession. They had
it where and in such condition and circumstances that escape was improbable, if not impossible. The defendant came upon the scene and
interfered by delivering a shot at a distance of three feet which finally
ended the animal's life. He took the animal and the plaintiff sued to3
recover the body of the wolf. This is the case of Liesner v. Wanie.
The court said:
"The instant a wild animal is brought under the control of a
person so that actual possession is practically inevitable, a vested
property interest in it occurs which cannot be divested by another's
intervening and killing it. * * * That at such instant the plaintiffs
were in vigorous pursuit of the same, the evidence is clear, and that
in a few moments, at most, they would have had actual possession
is quite clear. So we must hold the verdict was properly directed
[for the plaintiff] and the judgment properly rendered thereon."
This seems to be the first instance in the United States where the
courts have protected a hunter who did not have actual physical possession of the animal. It is the more "modern" view, a more liberal construction of old legal principles. Just how many of the courts of the
various states will fall in line, remains to be seen.
One hundred and nine years elapsed from the dictum in the Post
case to the decision sustaining it in the Liesner case. Yet that is relatively
a short period of time, for the law of the chase has been in the process of
formation for centuries. Kings and rulers throughout the ages have been
confronted by this problem. A brief review of the history of the law is
not amiss. The writer of a learned article in the Repertoire of the Journal
du Palais mentions the fact that, "The law of Athens forbade the killing
of game," and Merlin says that, "Solon, seeing the Athenians gave themto the neglect of the mechanical arts, forbade the
selves up to the chase
4
killing of game."Even the old problem of the sportsman and the farmer was present.
The Institutes of Justinian recbgnized the right of an owner of land to
forbid another from killing game on his property. At first the whim
of the king was the law. Gradually, however, restrictions were placed
on the royal prerogative and on the granting of the Magna Charta the
rights of the king were restricted and the small sportsman began to assert
'156 Wis. 16, 145 N. W. 374 (1914).
'Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600, 40 L. ed. 793 (1896).
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his rights.-' The rule of the Roman law which recognized the qualified
title of the sovereign in wild animals, having been adopted by England,
became the common law of the United States and here, today, title to
wild animals is in the state for the benefit of its citizens.
Originally the right to pursue and take animals wherever they
could be found existed and such right continued without hindrance until
the community ownership of the earth's surface was abandoned and
division of it was made among the multiplying human family. Then a
recognition of land title, rather than property in wild animals, prevented
the pursuit of game on the land of another.6 Today the legislatures of
the various states by statute prescribe the limit where public proprietorship ends and that of the individual begins. 7 But the right to pursue
and take any wild animal exists in every individual except so far as
restrained by express provision of law."
Barring questions of trespass, some of the legal principles evolved
can be summarized as follows: Individual property in wild animals
becomes vested in the person reducing them to possession, prior to which
time no individual can claim an exclusive right to them. Just what constitutes possession is not certain; cases are few. Originally actual physical
seizure was essential, but this doctrine has been modified, at least in Wisconsin, to the extent that mortal wounding of a beast coupled with
pursuit is sufficient to establish title. But pursuit alone gives no right
of property in animals ferae naturae.
The common law has been expressly repealed -by statute in some
jurisdictions. For example, in Charlebois v. Raymond" the court
pointed out that in that jurisdiction the civil law was different from the
common law in recognizing the first to wound a wild animal as the
owner of it. In that case the plaintiff recovered the value of a bear which
the defendant had killed while the plaintiff was pursuing it and after his
dogs wounded it. This,.of course, was the result of a specific law.
The question of what constitutes mortal wounding of an animal
can be of great importance. After the decision of Liesner v. Wanie was
announced, a case arose in Massachusetts which aptly illustrates the
point, i. e. the facts themselves as determined by the first court control the
outcome of the case.
Frank Dapson arose early one morning to go deer hunting. Donning his bright red cap and tucking his "old trusty" under his arm, Dapson took to the hills-and with good luck. Dapson surprised the mon53 Corpus Juris 18, §5, et seq.

'3 Corpus Juris 18, §§5 and 6.
'2 American Jurisprudence 698.
'Note (1914) 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 704.
'12 Lower Can. Jur. 55 (1867).
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arch of them all and proceeded to aim, fire and hit the buck. Mr. Buck,
however, refused to give up the ghost and rightfully betook himself to
other places. So far everything was all right, but, unfortunately for Mr.
Buck he encountered a gentleman by the name of Daly, who ended the
life of Mr. Buck. Dapson sued Daly to recover the carcass of the deer.
The lower court awarded the deer to Daly, finding that the deer was not
so wounded by Dapson that it was about to be deprived of its natural
liberty, and that the fatal shot was fired by Daly. Dapson appealed
but the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the verdict. However, the
Massachusetts court apparently rejected the principle of the Liesner case,
saying:
"The controlling principle of the common law is that the
huntsman acquires no title to a wild animal by pursuit alone, even
though there is wounding unless the animal is followed up and
reduced to occupation, that is, actual possession."10
If Dapson's aim had been truer and a mortal wound ensued, the
court might have arrived at a different decision.
We know from personal experience that these lawsuits are not tried
in a day. What the books fail to mention, and what I wonder is: how
did the venison taste after the case had been in court for several years?
Aside from the question of who is entitled to the kill, several other
interesting and equally knotty problems have arisen, e. g. possession out
of season. Of course possession must be legal. If game is killed out of
season, no right of property ensues."
A hungry man might try to poach a hare out of season, believing
his neighbors would not see him, but imagine the fortitude of a man
who took a moose out of season and thought he could conceal it! That
is just what one James did in Maine in 1889. He waited until the snows
got deep, drove the moose until it was exhausted, tied it up with ropes,
threw it on his sled and took the moose home, "a la Frank Buck." Wood
was a game warden who, hearing of James' feat, liberated the moose
unbeknown to James. James ued Wood 1 2 for damages caused by liberating the moose. The court refused to award him compensation, saying:
"So long, then, as the possession of live game is illegal, qualified property in it is illegal also, and the releasing of such game
interferes with no legal right or title of the person illegally holding
itcaptive."
Continuing, the court amplified its position:
0

" Supra note 3.
"Dapson v. Daly, 257 Mass. 195, 153 N. E. 454, 49 A. L. R. 1496 (1926).
"-James v. Wood, 82 Me. 173, 19 Ati. 160, 8 L. R. A. 448 (1889).

304

DICTA

"Suppose a hunter has his rifle leveled at game in close time
and someone shoves it aside so that the game is missed. Shall the
hunter have damages? He has only been prevented from committing a criminal act."
The illegal possession of game borders on the question of trespass,
i. e. pursuit of game on a man's ground without his permission. Of
this, much has been written. Thus, if possession is effected by one who
is at that moment a trespasser, no title to the property captured is created
in him, but it vests in the owner of the soil and the wrongdoer is liable
for the trespass. This rule, however, applies only where the game is
killed on the land whereon it is found. If a trespasser starts game on the
land of one person and kills it on that of another, he acquires title to the
game although he is liable in trespass at the suit of both landowners.1 3
These distinctions have been drawn very fine. For instance, in
Churchward v. Studdy,14 Churchward started a hare on the ground of a
third person and chased it into Studdy's field, where being quite spent,
the hare ran between the legs of one of Studdy's laborers, who picked the
hare up alive, but admittedly for the benefit of Churchward. The court
held Churchward was entitled to the hare as against Studdy, who came
up before the hunter and took possession of the hare from the laborer.
The court said, however, that had the laborer taken the hare for Studdy,
even though the dogs were about to catch it; the case would have been
different.
Here the court came near splitting the proverbial hare.
Summarizing, in the absence of statutes, the following principles
will generally control:
1. Possession is still "nine points of the law.."
2. "Possession" means actual physical possession of the animal.
3. Constructive possession, i. e. mortal wounding, plus fresh and
hot pursuit will suffice in some states.
4. The taking must be lawful, i. e. by a licensed hunter in season.
5. As against the landowner, a trespasser may have difficulty in
establishing his title.

Bold Face Listings Condemned
The Grievance and Ethics Committee wish to call the attention of
the members of the association to a recent opinion of the Professional
Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association holding that the listing of a lawyer's name in the noniclassified section of a telephone or city
directory in a distinctive manner, such as bold face type, followed by
words indicating the listee is a lawyer, is a form of advertising and as
such a violation of Canon 27.
'3 Corpus Juris 18, §5 et seq.
"14 East (K. B.) 249, 104 Riprint 596 (1811).

Irrigation and
Wild Animals
By ALLYN COLE*
Far apart as the subjects at first seem to be, it has been a source of
interesting speculation to me, as to just how far, if at all, Colorado pronouncements of principles of irrigation law have been influenced, perhaps
unconsciously, by fundamental conceptions as to property rights in animals ferae naturae-whether the doctrines of appropriation are not
merely adaptations of the law of the chase. At least there are many
striking resemblances in the two subjects, which, so far as I know, have
gone unnoticed.
The law of the chase, of course, is ancient indeed, and has its sources
far back of the dawn of history among primitive man. Its discussion in
Blackstone follows closely the pattern found in Justinian, where it is
treated as the law of nature.
Under the Roman law, wild animals belonged in common to all
citizens of the state' and might-be reduced to private ownership by capture "so long as it remains in your power, but when it has escaped and
recovers its natural liberty, it ceases to be yours, and again becomes the
property of him who captures it. "2 The same rule prevailed at common
law. 3 "All these things [wild animals], so long as they remain in possession, a man may enjoy, but if they escape him, or if he abandons their
use, they return to the common stock, and another man may seize them."'
But the. development of the law. of water followed an entirely different channel of thought under the common law. Reduction to ownership was not a part of the system, and instead there was developed the
theory of riparian rights, whereby one on a water course was entitled to
have the stream continue "undiminished and undefiled." Said Blackstone, "It is a nuisance to stop or divert water, that runs to another's
meadow or mill, by erecting a dye house or lime pit in the upper part of
*Of the Glenwood Springs bar; president Northwestern Colorado Bar Association.
'Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 319, 16 S. Ct. 600, 40 L. ed. 793 (1896).
2JUSTINIAN INST. lib. 2, tit.
1, §12.
'2 BLACKSTONE COMM.. c. 25.
BLACKSTONE COMM.c.
3205
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the stream, or in short to do any act therein, that in its consequences must
necessarily prejudice one's neighbor.'' 5
It is true, the irrigators of the arid West were not the first to adopt
theories of rightful use of water from streams for consumptive use in
agriculture. The ancient Peruvians, and certain other agricultural Indians, made use of water for irrigation of their fields, and constructed
vast systems for its beneficial enjoyment. But these systems, it seems
likely, were socialistic in organization and use and adapted to a scheme
of land tenure entirely at variance with the individualistic land ownership of the common law. Indeed, the dim pages of earliest recorded history contain references to irrigation as a going concern, and evidences of
well established systems are found among the ruins of long forgotten
civilizations wherever climatic conditions required supplement to natural
rainfall. We cannot be sure as to the laws under which most of these
early systems operated, but it is at least probable that private property
rights themselves were not a part of earlier civilizations, and certainly not
of primitive man. It is probable that the first property right, aside from
personal adornments and implements of the chase, was in the product of
the chase-wild animals. Private ownership in things, whether real or
personal, was not a part of early systems, and the enjoyment of things,
of whatever nature, was merely a right in him who had, and could maintain, possession. As land, animals and objects passed into ownership, it
still had to do only with land which could be occupied; with objects
which could be hoarded; or with animals which could be herded and
controlled, or which, by domestication, had lost the will to be free.
Probably as the last remnant of laws formerly extending to all man's
dominions, there remained, and still remains, the law as to property
rights in wild animals, which arise with capture and end with escape.
But, is this not also the law of water under the doctrine of appropriation?
Stemming, as they did, from well watered countries, and steeped
as they were in the doctrines of the common law, it is not likely that our
early law-makers, judicial or legislative, were much influenced by irrigation laws of other places, ancient or modern. They were, on the other
hand, familiar with the doctrine of riparian rights, which was not applicable to their condition. In the face of that doctrine, and in violation of
52 BLACKSTONE COMM. C. 13.
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it, necessity compelled them to take water from the stream, and "take a
chance." Having taken it, where look for justification?
Among pioneer people, who look to furs and venison for their cash
crop and daily bread, the law of the chase assumes considerable importance. Its every nicety is known. And here on mountain side and in
valley was another life-sustaining element-water, as sly at capture as
fox or beaver; as difficult to tame and enjoy as wolf or wildcat. The
slithering stream, chained today with frail diversion dams and transported to place of use in weak and makeshift ditches, might rise in the
night to break its chains and quickly return to its native habitat and
channel. Captured for a season, it -might escape, or its temporary owner
abandon its use. Like the deer in the woods, it belonged to him who
might take it, but when it escaped again, ownership was no more feasible
than ownership of the escaped deer.
Since it was useful to use, it was natural that man's dominion
should be extended to cover water, as his dominion had been extended
to other objects of need or desire. Riparian rights to undiminished flow
had no place here because not useful. So, of necessity, some other rule
must be applied. What more natural then, than the application of the
law of the chase, already familiar to all? And, without knowing it,
did not those who made the new rules, merely apply to water the rules
they already applied to their trap lines and to the game all about them?
Note the similarity:
Game belongs to the public; unappropriated water "is hereby declared to be the property of the public." ' It is so declared by our constitution, but was true before the Constitution was written.
Property rights in wild animals arise from capture; property rights
in water arise from appropriation.
Property rights in wild animals are lost by escape back to nature;
property rights in water are lost when it escapes to the stream again.
But, "If a deer reclaimed has a collar or other mark upon him, and
goes and returns at his pleasure, remaining not long absent, the owner's
property in him still continues," says Blackstone. So, also, water diverted from a stream and "collared and marked" by measurement, may
'COLO.

CONST. Art. XVI, §5.
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be let into another natural stream, and the property right therein continue
so that it may be taken out and used by the original appropriator.
"He has a transient property in game within his own domains, but
when they leave such locality, the property ceases," says Blackstone. The
spring of water upon one's land belongs to him, if it does not naturally
flow to a common stream; then it, too, is subject to appropriation, and
the property right ceases.
We have no individual ownership of wild animals in the forest.
We have no individual ownership of water in a stream, unless like a
wild animal, we put it there marked or measured for identification.
Game taken from the forest may be loosed in an enclosed park, and
property rights remain while the fence holds. Water taken from a stream
may be impounded in a reservoir, and property rights remain till the
dam breaks.
One who has captured a wild animal is liable for the damage it may
do. One who takes water from a stream is liable for its damage under
about the same circumstances.
"But," says Blackstone, "this right [to take game] may be restricted
by positive laws for the benefit of the community." Like game laws, the
state may also regulate the matter of appropriation, storage and use of
water, in the public interest.
The laws as to taking by trespass seem to be similar in cases of wild
animals and water. One may exclude the trespasser, but one taking by
trespass owns, notwithstanding. "For," says Justinian as to game, "natural reason gives to the first occupant that which has no previous owner."
A like rule applies to unappropriated water.
Is not the doctrine which dates back priority rights to the
date of
commencement of construction, if diligently pursued, but the old doctrine of the "hot trail" of the chase?
And so, the speculation continues.
I have never heard of anyone citing the law of wild animals in an
irrigation case, but some day, in absence of something better, I'm going
to try it. It looks to me from where I sit like better authority than
some I have seen followed, and maybe the courts will yet recognize the
applicability of the law of the chase as controlling in the matter of the
pursuit after equally furtive and elusive water for irrigation purposes.
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Sustaining Memberships Created in State Bar
Sustaining memberships were authorized under an amendment to
the by-laws proposed at the recent convention at Colorado Springs and
the machinery to put them into effect has been approved by the Board of
Governors. The plan calls for contributions of $25.00 for each year by
those members of the association who decide to become sustaining members, and a committee will soon be announced by the president to solicit
these memberships. Funds received from sustaining members will be
used to expedite the activities of the Colorado Bar Association. George
Corlett of Monte Vista, a member of the Board of Governors, became
the first sustaining member when he enclosed his check for $25.00 when
voting for the plan as a member of the Board of Governors. A list of
sustaining members will be printed in DICTA.

Too Straight, Maybe
The witness was on the 9tand to testify as to the good character of
the accused, who was on trial for shooting a police officer. The usual
preliminary questions were asked and answered in the affirmative. Then
came the chief question, propounded with great gusto:
"Now, what is this man's general reputation?"
The witness responded with equal gusto:
"He was known everywhere as a straight shooter!"

Northwestern Bar Adopts Minimum Fees
A meeting of the Northwestern Colorado Bar Association was held
in Glenwood Springs on September 27, 1941, at the Cosgriff Hotel.
Fifty-one members and guests were present. Judge John R. Clark of the
Ninth Judicial District gave a full report of the meeting held by the state
association at Colorado Springs on September 12 and 13. John L. J.
Hart of Denver spoke on the new federal revenue tax law and W. W.
Platt, president of the state association, also addressed the meeting. Resolutions were adopted extending sympathy to the family of the late
E. T. Taylor, Congressman for the Fourth District. At the annual ban-
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quet, held at the Hotel Colorado in Glenwood Springs on August 7,
1941, the following officers were elected: Allyn Cole of Glenwood
Springs, president, Fred Videgon of Craig, first vice-president, Percy
Rigby of Meeker, second vice-president, Sadie H. Korn of Glenwood
Springs, secretary-treasurer, and Judge William Atha Mason of Rifle as a
member of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association.
Matters pertaining to minimum fees for the Ninth Judicial District were
discussed and adopted. The association also favored a county law library
in Garfield and Rio Blanco counties.
-- Sadie H. Korn.

Opposition
Our friends G. Dexter Blount and Arthur R. Morrison were on
opposite sides of a will contest which was being tried in the District
Court in Fairplay. The testator had been a prominent pioneer mining
man and almost the whole town turned out for the trial. It was midsummer and all the windows on three sides of the little court room were
open. Both attorneys were relatively unacquainted in the community
and both were making the greatest effort to create a favorable impression with the spectators as well as with the jury. Mr. Blount was
making his opening statement. Suddenly a stray burro, which was
grazing just outside the court house, set up a loud braying. At first
Dexter attempted to sandwich his remarks in between outbursts from
the outside, then raised his voice as the heehaws settled into a steady
rhythm. There were titters from the spectators, then laughter and
finally everyone in the court room-judge, jury, counsel and spectators
were convulsed in laughter.
In a slight pause, created principally by the burro, Mr. Morrison
turned to Mr. Blount and in a hoarse whisper, obviously intended to
be heard over the entire room, said, "It seems you have serious opposition."
"Yes," replied Mr. Blount quickly, "one outside and one inside."

The Berries
Judge Arlington Taylor of Fort Morgan reports a case recently filed
in Morgan County, "J. P. Curry, plaintiff, v. Frank D. Berry, Mary B.
Berry, Elda Berry, et at., defendants."

